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Do children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) develop the ability to take into account an
agent’s mental states when they are judging the morality of his or her actions? The present article
aims to answer this question by reviewing recent evidence on moral reasoning on children with
autism and typical development. A basic moral judgment (e.g., judgments of violations in which
negative intentions are followed by negative consequences) and the ability to distinguish between
conventional and moral violations appear to be spared in autism (Leslie et al., 2006). However,
a closer look at the data reveals that these capacities can be explained by the tendency of ASD
individuals to rely heavily on actions consequences and other external factors rather than agents’
mental states. By contrast, studies that presented typically developing (TD) children with accidental
and failed attempts actions have shown that even preschoolers can display an intent-based moral
judgment (e.g., Cushman et al., 2013; Margoni and Surian, 2016). The tendency to rely on outcome
in ASD children is further confirmed by those studies that direcly show that ASD individuals fail to
attend to the agents’ intentions when the cases are more complex or ambiguous, like in accidentally
harmful actions or failed attempts to harm. We propose that the impairment in understanding
others’ mind hinders the development of an intent-based moral judgment in children with ASD.
MENTAL STATE REASONING IN THE MORAL JUDGMENT TASKS
In our social life, we often engange in the evaluation of others’ actions and intentions, and we
are very sensitive to harmful acts and violations of rights. For example, we maintain friendships
on the basis on an assessment of our friends’ moral behaviors toward us. The production and the
justification of a moral judgment is a complex socio-cognitive task that often requires the use of
mental state reasoning abilities (Young et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2011). In particular when people
are asked to evaluate accidental harming (or helping) actions or failed attempts to harm (or help),
they need to weigh the agents’ intention, that requires a mental state analysis, against the external
consequences of the action. Several neuroscientific studies confirm the association between moral
judgment and theory of mind (Young et al., 2007, 2010; Young and Saxe, 2009).
Then, to what extent individuals with ASD, who present deficits in theory of mind abilities
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985, 2000; Bowler, 1992; Surian and Leslie, 1999; Abell et al., 2000;
Castelli et al., 2002), meet with difficulties in the acquisition of an intent-based moral judgment?
Individuals with ASD are characterized by impaired social interactions and communication
abilities, and a set of restricted and repetitive behaviors. Here we focus on their impairment
in mentalizing, that has been shown to be a main factor affecting their socio-moral abilities.
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Studies on themoral judgment of ASD children have traditionally
focused on (a) the capacity to distinguish between moral and
social-conventional transgressions and (b) the ways in which
individuals with autism judge the moral rightness or wrongness
of an action.
MORAL AND CONVENTIONAL
TRANSGRESSIONS
One fundamental aspect of the moral competence has been
identified by social domain theorists in the capacity to distinguish
between moral and social-conventional violations. While the
former involve a victim and are to be blamed regardless of the
social context, the latter do not need to involve a victim and are
contingent over a specific group consensus or authority mandate
(Turiel, 1978; Nucci, 1981; Killen and Smetana, 2015). By the age
of three, children judge moral violations, like hit someone, more
harshly, and less authority-dependent than social-conventional,
like wearing pajamas at school (Nucci, 1985; Smetana and
Braeges, 1990).
The capacity to distinguish between these two types of
violation is intact in ASD individuals (Blair, 1996; Rogers
et al., 2006; Zalla et al., 2011; Shulman et al., 2012). However,
ASD individuals produce poorer justifications compared to TD
individuals, and they do not evaluate moral violations as more
serious than non-moral but disgusting actions, such as drinking
tomato soup out of the bowl at a dinner party.Moreover, contrary
to TD children, school-aged children with ASD are swayed by the
victims’ emotion and judge wrong actions that caused the crying
of the victim more harshly than wrong actions that did not cause
any crying (Weisberg and Leslie, 2012). ASD children usually
succeed in tasks devised to investigate the moral-conventional
distinction, but they rely mainly on external factors that could
depend on irrelevant variables such as the particular emotional
level of the agents.
THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF INTENTION
AND OUTCOME IN THE JUDGMENTS OF
ASD INDIVIDUALS
A working hypothesis here is that ASD children respond as TD
children do when they are presented with simple, unambiguous
moral cases (i.e., a negative/positive outcome produced by
an intentional action with the same valence). In those cases,
the difficulties encountered in integrating the mental state
understanding in the moral reasoning can be overcome by the
children’s reliance on action outcomes and victims’ emotional
reactions. For this reason, ASD children appear to develop a basic
moral judgment.
ASD school-aged children evaluate actions that are motivated
by positive or negative intentions and are followed by congruent
outcomes as TD children do (Leslie et al., 2006; Li et al.,
2014). Moreover, they are able to judge an agent that caused
intentionally a bad outcome more harshly than an agent that
caused it accidentally, although they do not produce verbal
justifications that refer to the agent’s intention (Grant et al.,
2005). However, Steele et al. (2003) found that children with
ASD aged 4–14 failed to distinguish between intentional and
accidental bad acts (e.g., failing to come to a planned meeting
as a result of canceling the plan without telling or as a result
of the bus breaking). Studies on ASD adults also showed
that they judge an accidental harm both more punishable and
more intentional compared to TD adults, suggesting a partial
impairment in the ability to rely on intentions (Buon et al., 2013;
see also Rogé andMullet, 2011; Zalla and Leboyer, 2011; Salvano-
Pardieu et al., 2015). Nevertheless, ASD school-aged children
distinguish between a distressed victim and an individual in
distress that however is not a victim (Leslie et al., 2006). So,
their judgments do not completely rely on the external outcomes
assessment.
However, what about the judgments of more complex cases
such as the failed attempts to help or harm, that require a more
substantial contribution of mental state reasoning? In fact, in
judging an ambiguous case such as a failed attempt to harm, it is
not possible to rely solely on action outcomes, and still produce a
moral condemnation of the agent.
A first evidence of an outcome-bias in the judgment in
ASD individuals comes from those studies that reported a
“heteronomous” (i.e., rules are understood as handed down
by authority, and violations are wrong because they produce
bad outcomes, namely they lead to punishment) rather than
an “autonomous” (i.e., rules are based on socially agreed-on
principles, and violations are wrong because of the agent’s beliefs
and motivations) moral reasoning in ASD school-aged children
(Grant et al., 2005; Takeda et al., 2007; see also Fadda et al.,
2016). ASD children attributed moral wrongness and badness
to actions that caused bad outcomes. A second and more direct
evidence comes from a study that presented ASD individuals with
accidental and failed attempted harms. Moran et al. (2011) found
that they failed to distinguish between the two scenarios, and they
judged the accidental harm significantly more harshly than TD
individuals. Moreover, there is evidence of an activation of the
right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ)—an area associated with
mental state reasoning—in TD individuals during the evaluation
of intentional vs. accidental harm, but such result has not been
found in adults with ASD (Koster-Hale et al., 2013). These results
clearly suggest that ASD individuals fail to integrate the agent’s
mental states in their moral reasoning when judging situations
in which intentions and outcomes present different valences (see
Figure 1).
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
STUDIES ON MENTAL REASONING IN ASD
INDIVIDUALS’ MORAL JUDGMENTS
Three main theoretical implications relevant for the current
understanding of the relationship between theory of mind and
moral reasoning could be inferred from the results we briefly
discussed. First, the evidence that ASD individuals, who are
characterized by an impaired mental state understanding, show
an atypical moral judgment, further confirms that theory of mind
is fundamental for the development of a mature moral reasoning.
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FIGURE 1 | Main results concerning the mental state reasoning in ASD individuals’ moral reasoning.
Second, the study of moral judgment in ASD individuals
could prove useful in assessing the role of cognitive empathy in
the production of a moral evaluation. ASD individuals show a
spared capacity for emotional empathy (e.g., Blair, 1999; Rogers
et al., 2007), that is, the proper emotional response to others’
emotions, but an impaired capacity for cognitive empathy, that
is, the proper knowing how others may feel. While emotional
empathy skills help ASD children developing a basic moral
judgment by relying on the emotional and external aspects
of the moral case such as the victims’ emotional reactions or
the actions outcomes (Leslie et al., 2006; Hobson et al., 2009;
Weisberg and Leslie, 2012), the poor understanding of the
cognitive aspects hinders the development of an intent-based
moral judgment. Further studies confirm this interpretation by
reporting that aspects related to cognitive empathy impairment
affect the moral evaluations of ASD individuals (Channon et al.,
2010; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Patil et al., 2016).
A third relevant theoretical implication concerns whether the
action understanding required in moral evaluation is mentalistic.
A mentalistic understanding represents and explains others’
actions by ascribing mental states such as beliefs, desires, and
internal representations to the agents (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985; Leslie, 1987; Surian et al., 2007; Baillargeon et al., 2010).
By contrast, a non-mentalistic or teleological understanding
represents others’ actions without ascribing mental states, by
linking directly the agent’s actions, the goal-states and the
situational constraints through the principle of rational actions
(i.e., agents act to achieve certain goals choosing the most
efficient means; Gergely and Csibra, 2003; Schlottmann et al.,
2009). According to the proponents of teleological accounts of
action understanding, humans first develop very early in life
a non-mentalistic understanding, and only later they acquire a
mentalistic understanding. While it could be argued that ASD
individuals possess the ability to interpret actions in a non-
mentalistic way already during preschool years (Hamilton, 2009;
Vivanti et al., 2011), we have seen that they do not develop a
mature intent-basedmoral judgment. Therefore, the literature on
ASD individuals suggests that a non-mentalistic understanding
is not sufficient for the development of a full-blown intent-based
moral reasoning.
CONCLUSIONS
The ability to produce moral evaluations often requires the
understanding of others’ mental states and it is central for
living in human social groups. While much more research is
needed to acquire a full understanding of the development
of moral judgment in ASD individuals, the current state of
the literature suggests that this clinical population encounters
some difficulties in developing a mature intent-based moral
judgment because of the well-known impairment in mental
state understanding. Nevertheless, ASD individuals show the
ability to produce a basic moral judgment by relying on external
cues such as the action outcomes and the victims’ emotional
reactions.
Can these results turn out to be useful in guiding programs
designed to improve moral judgment in children with ASD?
Since a main result of the literature we reviewed is that
individuals with ASD show difficulties in integrating mental
states information in their judgments, clinical treatments, and
educational programs aimed at improving their theory of
mind abilities are likely to have, as a side-effect, a positive
impact also on their moral reasoning abilities. Further research
is needed to point out whether such a desiderable effect is
achieved equally by any effective training on mentalizing skills
(e.g., Silver and Oakes, 2001; Fisher and Happé, 2005; Begeer
et al., 2011), or it is best achieved by a program that requires
both mental state attribution and the generation of moral
judgments.
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